Abstract Recent literature presented arguments linking income inequality to the financial crash of [2007][2008]. One proposed channel is expected to work through bank credit. I analyze the relationship between income inequality and bank credit in a panel cointegration framework and find that they have a long-run dependency relationship. Results show that income inequality contributed to the increase of bank credit in developed economies after the Second World War.
between inequality and credit, where higher inequality leads to higher level of bank loans through the consumption smoothing of middle-income and poor households. This article shows that there is a long-run steady-state relationship between income inequality and bank loans in developed economies and that it is likely inequality contributed to the high levels of bank credit after the Second World War.
Bordo and Meissner estimate the effect of change in income inequality on the growth of bank loans and find "very little evidence linking credit booms and financial crises to rising inequality" (Bordo and Meissner 2012, p. 2148 ). However, it is possible that inequality has a long-run (level) instead of a short-run (change) effect on bank credit. Actually, a majority of the theories proposing a channel between inequality and credit, or leverage, model the channel as a trending long-run relationship. The analysis of this kind of long-run relationship is complicated by the fact that bank loans tend to grow over time, whereas the generally used measures of income inequality, like the top 1 % income share, are bounded from above. This creates a problem, because it is not possible for something that is not trending to have a long-run equilibrium relationship with something that is upward trending, in the first two moments at least. There are two ways around this problem: the trending series can be detrended or it can be bounded using some suitable transformation. Detrending of the series is problematic, because it will remove the very thing under interest, that is, the trend. Fortunately, there is a natural candidate by which the series can be transformed.
The top 1 % income share measures the share of national income concentrated on the hands of the highest percentile of income earners. As GDP is, in practice, the national income of a country, the share of total income received by top 1 % of the earners can also be presented as income of the top 1 % GDP . Therefore, it would be natural to convert bank loans the same way, i.e., bank loans GDP . This transformation would make the measures comparable, as both would be expressed as a percentage of total income, or GDP, without removing the possible long-run relationship that may exist between inequality and credit. As explained above, household leverage is modeled as workers debt-to-income ratio in the theoretical model by Kumhof et al. (2015) . Thus, credit-to-GDP ratio is also a more accurate statistical approximation of the measure of leverage used by Kumhof, Ranciére and Winant than the level or the first difference of bank credit.
In this article, I analyze the relationship between income inequality and credit as ratios to GDP using data on the income share of top 1 % income earners, bank credit and bank loans to households and non-profit organizations in eight developed economies. I control for several factors that are assumed to contribute on the growth of credit. The results indicate that the top 1 % income share and the real GDP shares of credit and loans to household are driven by stochastic trends. Bank credit and top 1 % income share as well as loans to household and the top 1 % income share series are also found to be cointegrated of order one implying that they have long-run equilibrium relationships. The long-run elasticities of the GDP shares of bank credit and household loans with respect to income inequality are estimated with panel dynamic seemingly unrelated regression (DSUR) estimator and they are found to be positive. The top 1 % income share is also found to predict the share of bank credit, but not the other way around using a Granger non-causality test. The top 1 % income and the GDP share of household loans are found to have an instantaneous statistical relation, but the direction of the flow of statistical information cannot be established.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents theoretical channels through which inequality could affect credit. Section 3 presents the data and gives the results of panel unit root tests. Results of estimations, cointegration and Granger non-causality tests are reported in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical channels
Several theories have been proposed to explain the possible relationship between income inequality and bank credit. According to Frank (2005) , inequality may lead to an increase in the household lending by increasing relative consumption differences. When the top income earners consume more with their increased income by, for example, buying bigger and more expensive houses, this creates a motive for the less fortunate income earners to consume more on their houses leading to increasing indebtedness among poorer households. 1 Rajan (2010) , on the other hand, proposes a political economy channel. According to him, inequality forced politicians in the US to improve the situation of low-and middle-income households to avoid losing them as voters at the turn of the millennium. Because redistribution in the form of social security payments or increasing the progressivity of taxation are unpopular solutions in the US political environment, redistribution in the form of subsidized housing finance was enacted. This subsidized mortgage lending together with the concurrent deregulation of the financial sector led to the observed housing boom and the crash that followed.
Concentrating on the other end of the income distribution, Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010) argue that income inequality leads to depressed aggregate demand, which forces central banks to lower interest rates. Simultaneously, rich household, who benefit from increasing inequality, search for high-yield investments driving asset bubbles through the accumulation of private debt. According to Stockhammer (2013) , income inequality leads to speculation, that is, to risk-taking and increasing leverage among wealthier households, because inequality exhausts their consumption opportunities. Stiglitz (2009) argued that faced with stagnating real incomes, poorer households borrow to maintain their rising standard of living, a theory which was formalized by Kumhof et al. (2015) . In the model by Kumhof et al. (2015) , investors (the top 5 % of income earners) own the whole stock of physical capital and derive their income from the physical capital and from interest on loans to workers. The bargaining power between investors and workers determines the distribution of income in the economy. In this setup, a decrease in the bargaining power of workers leads to higher income inequality by lowering the wages of workers, which induces higher lending from investors as they have surplus funds to invest. The more the workers' real income drops, the more they have to borrow to maintain their level of consumption. This creates a trending relation between income inequality and bank credit, where higher income income inequality leads to higher levels of credit. However, income inequality tends to grow very rapidly in the face of the decreasing bargaining power of workers, whereas leverage, or the debt-to-real income ratio of workers grows more steadily. The process of leveraging is gradual because borrowing matches the decreasing real income of workers as they do not increase their consumption, but just try to maintain their original level of consumption. That is why short-run changes in income inequality may not have an effect on the growth of bank credit. What matters for bank credit is the longrun, trending relationship between credit and income inequality. Extending their analysis to an open economy, Kumhof et al. (2012) show that rising inequality endogenously creates credit expansion by increasing leverage and current account deficits.
What unites basically all of the above-mentioned theoretical channels is that they establish a trending, i.e., a long-run relationship between inequality and credit, where increasing inequality leads to accumulation of credit (or leverage) over time. That is, they imply that income inequality would contribute to cycles of credit. Klein (2015) has already shown that there exists a long-run relationship between bank credit and income inequality. This study extends and deepens the analysis initiated by Klein by controlling for different factors of credit creation and by assessing the direction of statistical information between income inequality and credit.
Data and unit root tests
My main data on bank loans comes from the dataset of Schularik and Taylor (2012) . The annual data on bank loans includes the end-of-year amount of lending by domestic banks to domestic households and non-financial corporations in domestic currency excluding lending within the financial system. Banks are defined as monetary institutions and they include savings banks, postal banks, credit unions, mortgage associations, and building associations. The data on bank loans is extremely heterogeneous, as described by Schularick and Taylor. Credit, money and banking institutions differ profoundly across countries and in some cases historical data on credit covers only commercial banks. 2 Like Schularik and Taylor, I tackle the issue of heterogeneity by using country-related constants. Because most (but not all) of the theories presented in Section 2 hypothesize that inequality would lead to increases in household indebtedness, I test the relationship using data on credit to private households and non-profit institutions provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) (Dembiermont et al. 2013) .
I use the pre-tax top 1 % income share of the population to proxy the income inequality. 3 The data on top income shares are obtained from the World Top Income Database (Alvaredo et al. 2016 ). There are a few yearly observations missing from the top 1 % income share data, which I replace by averages of the values preceding and following the missing observation. Leigh (2007) has demonstrated that the top 1 % income share series have a high correlation with other measures of income inequality, like the Gini index, which makes the series a comparable measure of income inequality. The top 1 % income share series are also correlated with the labor income share (−0.212, p-value: <0.001) . 4 Some of the theoretical channels presented above also concentrate on the relationship between accumulation of debt and incomes of the rich households. These features make the top 1 % income share rather well-suited measure of income inequality for this study.
In addition to income concentration, I use several macroeconomic aggregates attributed as factors behind credit growth as control variables. These include the real GDP per capita, investments as a share of GDP, short-term interest rates, and broad money (M2) as a share of GDP. The data on investment as a share of GDP, short-term interest rates, and broad 2 The key sources of the data are the official statistical publications, including the All Bank Statistics by the US Federal Reserve and the Geld-und Kreditwesenstatistik by the German Bundesbank. For more information about the bank loans data, please see Schularik and Taylor (2012, p. 1033) . 3 Although it would be optimal to use the after tax income shares because many of the theories presented in Section 2 are related to disposable or after tax income, gross and net income shares tend to mimic similar developments in the distribution of income (Debacker et al. 2013; Anselman and Krämer 2015) . The time dimension of the data of net income shares currently available is also very limited (Alvaredo et al. 2016) , which makes it unsuitable for any kind of time series analysis. 4 Labor income share for the eight countries was obtained from the OECD database and it ranged from 1970 to 2008. (2016) and Schularik and Taylor (2012) money (M2) as a share of GDP is obtained from the dataset of Schularik and Taylor (2012) . The data on real GDP is taken from the Maddison dataset of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (Bolt and van Zanden 2014). As explained above, leverage is modeled as the debt to real income ratio in the theoretical model by Kumhof et al. (2015) . Thus, to test the hypotheses by Kumhof et al. (2015) , I use the ratio of bank credit and loans to private households to real GDP as dependent variables. Descriptive statistics for the data are presented in Appendix.
Because of the limitations of the data on top 1 % income share, I am able to construct a balanced panel on eight industrialized economies. 5 Many of the theories presented in Section 2 assume that the financial system is able to both provide credit to all income classes and produce financial innovations. Only a highly developed financial systems found in rich economies can produce both of these outcomes, which makes them a natural starting point for the analysis. The baseline dataset spans from 1959 to 2008. (2016) and Dembiermont et al. (2013) presents the time series of the ratio of credit to households as of real GDP and the mean of the top 1 % income share in our data. Figure 1 shows a roughly similar pattern in all eight countries. During the period of 1959-1980, the share of income of the top 1 % decreased, but at the same time the share of bank loans increased, although only marginally. During that period, income inequality decreased the most in Sweden and in France. After 1980 the share of income earned by the top 1 % and the share of bank credit to real GDP grew at a very similar pace in all countries. This period after 1980 gives some evidence in favor of the "trending hypothesis" stating that bank credit is increased with inequality. During this period, bank credit diminished only in Japan, which suffered from a decade long recession that began in 1991. Figure 2 shows that the relationship between loans to household and the top 1 % income shares is quite similar than between bank credit and top 1 % income shares presented in Fig. 1 considering that the data ranges only from 1980 to 2008. Because of the country-related heterogeneity that is clearly present in both figures, the best way to analyze the possible relationship between the variables is to test are the different trend processes driven by the same factor(s).
Therefore, I start by testing the time series properties of the data. As the time series extent of the data (with a maximum of 50 annual observations) is too short for country-specific time series testing, I use two sets of panel unit root tests to test for the possible stochastic trends. The first two are the so-called first-generation tests, by Im et al. (2003) (IPS) and the Fisher type ADF test by Maddala and Wu (1999) . These tests assume that there is no crosssectional correlation between the units of the panel. The second generation panel unit root tests by Pesaran (2007) and Phillips and Sul (2003) allow for cross-sectional correlation within the panel. In all tests, the null hypothesis is that the series is trend-stationary. 6 A more detailed introduction to the tests used is provided in the Online Appendix. Table 1 presents the results of panel unit root tests for the six included variables. According to results presented in Table 1 , all panel unit root tests find the share of bank credit to real GDP as well as the share of household loans to real GDP to be unit root processes, i.e., tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of an unit root in either of the series. Three out of four tests find the top 1 % income share and the share of broad money to GDP to be unit root processes. Two out of the four tests find the real GDP per capita to be an unit root process and one out of the four tests find the share of investments to GDP to be an unit root process. According to all tests, the short-term interest rate is a trend-stationary process. 7 Top 1 % income shares are (naturally) bounded from above and below. Because of this, the results of Table 1 challenges the traditional view of unit root processes, because the variance of a bounded series, like the top 1 % income share, cannot grow to infinity with time. 8 However, when individual stochastic series of, e.g., household income are combined, their 6 Under the null, the series is stationary with a deterministic trend. 7 According to all second generation panel unit root tests, the first differences of credit to real GDP, household loans to real GDP, top 1 % income share, investments to GDP, money to GDP and GDP per capita are trend-stationary processes (see the Online Appendix). 8 I also run panel unit root tests on logit-transformed series, because the logit transformation removes upper and lower bounds. Results were basically unchanged from those presented in Table 1 (see the Online  Appendix). aggregate series is likely to be characterized by random walk (Rossanan and Seater 1995) . It is also possible that the distribution has a stochastic trend in moments other than the variance, including mean, skewness and kurtosis (White and Granger 2010) . Therefore, when individual random walk income series are aggregated to a bounded distribution, this distribution may have a stochastic trend in its kurtosis and/or in its skewness (Malinen 2013) . Several studies have found that bounded income series, like the Gini index and the top income share series, are characterized by a random walk (see Mocan 1999; Parker 2000; Jäntti and Jenkins 2010; Malinen 2012; Herzer and Vollmer 2013 among others) . Kalliovirta and Malinen (2015) also show that because of the nonlinear structure of top 1 % income series, they can be approximated by a random walk. In the light of all these results, we approximate the top 1 % income share series by a random walk process through the rest of this study.
Cointegration tests and estimations

Panel cointegration testing
According to unit root tests presented in Table 1 , stochastic trends would drive the time series of the top 1 % income share and the shares of bank credit and household loans to real GDP. Next I test if the stochastic trends are linear combinations of one and another, that is, I test whether the series cointegrated. To this end, I use the panel cointegration test proposed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011) (from now on BC). BC's test allows for crosssectional correlation through common factors and it also controls for possible structural breaks in the cointegration relation. A more detailed description of the test is provided in the Online Appendix.
The models for testing for cointegration between inequality and credit are:
where the levels of bank credit and loans to households are explained by the level of inequality, and (1, −γ i ) and (1, −δ i ) are the country-specific cointegration vectors between the share of bank credit and the top 1 % income share and between the share of household loans and the top 1 % income share. Under the null hypothesis γ i , δ i = 1 ∀ i implying that variables are not cointegrated. I include individual constants due to heterogeneity of the data on bank loans discussed in the previous section. Results of panel cointegration tests based on the models (1) and (2) are presented in Table 2 . 9 Five out of the eight test statistics in Table 2 find that the series of top 1 % income share and the share of credit on real GDP are cointegrated of order one at the 5 % level of significance. 8 out 8 test statistics in Table 2 find that the series of top 1 % income share and the share of household loans on real GDP are cointegrated of order one at the 5 % level of significance. Results presented in the last column give some indication that deterministic trends may need to be incorporated in the estimated model between top 1 % shares and the share of credit to real GDP. Still, the overall conclusions from cointegration tests is clear: both the top 1 % income share and credit to real GDP as well as the top 1 % income share The null hypothesis is that the variables are not cointegrated. Constants states that individual constants were used in the test, and trends that individual constants and trends were used in the test. Tests with level and cointegration vector shifts allow for structural breaks to occur in the country-specific cointegration relations. For the cointegration relationship between credit/RGDP and top 1 % income share, the 5 % critical value for both Z tests with constants (with or without shifts) is −2.219. For the cointegration relationship between credit/RGDP and top 1 % income share, the 5 % critical value for both Z tests with trends (with or without shifts) is −2.120. For the cointegration relationship between hcredit/RGDP and top 1 % income share, the 5 % critical value for both Z tests with constants (with or without shifts) is −2.283. For the cointegration relationship between hcredit/RGDP and top 1 % income share, the 5 % critical value for both Z tests with trends (with or without shifts) is −2.048. Ci is a short for cointegration and household loans to real GDP seem to be cointegrated indicating that the series have a long-run steady-state relationships.
Estimations
In addition to income inequality, several other macroeconomic and financial variables may affect the level of credit. Following Borio and White (2003) , Mendoza and Terrones (2008) and Bordo and Meissner (2012) , I include the growth rate of real GDP, investments as a share of GDP, level of broad money as a share of GDP as well as short term interest rates as control variables. Real GDP reflects the level of real economic activity, which is likely to have a direct of effect on the demand for credit. Investments of households and firms are usually funded with loans. Central banks can steer aggregate credit through monetary aggregates by, e.g., changing reserve requirements of commercial banks. Jorda et al. (2016) show that environments with low interest rates lead to an increase in mortgage lending and housing price booms. This holds especially for short-term interest rates, because banks usually base their lending rates on short-term interest rates. First differencing of cointegrated variables removes stochastic trends and eliminates the long-run dependency between the variables. What remains is a short-run relation, which may or may not exist. To test for this, I first estimate a model where the variables are first differenced. More precisely, I estimate a model:
where α i are individual constants and u it is the idiosyncratic error term. Explanatory variables are lagged with one period to control for the possible endogeneity of regressors.
The results reported in Table 3 indicate that income inequality would not have a statistically significant short-run effect on bank credit or loans to private households. This, combined with the results of cointegration tests presented in the previous section, indicates that both relationships are long-run, that is, trending in nature in agreement with many of the theories presented in Section 2.
I use the panel DSUR estimator by Mark et al. (2005) to estimate the cointegration coefficient of top 1 % income share using models:
where α i and η i are individual constants, θ t and ϑ t are the common time effects, (1, −γ ) is the cointegrating vector between bank credit and the top 1 % income share, (1, −δ ) is the cointegrating vector between household loans and the top 1 % income share, X it is the matrix of additional explanatory variables (as above), and u it and v it are the idiosyncratic Table 4 presents the results of the panel DSUR estimations of model (3) using the dataset spanning from 1959 to 2008. 12 First differences of the GDP per capita and shares of M2 and investment to GDP are included as additional explanatory variables.
According to the results presented in Table 4 , the cointegration coefficient of top 1 % income share is positive and highly statistically significant. 13 The value of the cointegrating coefficient varies from around 0.28 to around 0.31. When all the control variables are included in estimation (last column of Table 4), the coefficient of the GDP per capita growth is not statistically significant and the change in the level of money has an expected positive sign and is statistically significant. The coefficient on investments as a share of GDP has an unexpected negative and statistically significant sign. This may be due to the possible correlation between investments and interest rate. Higher demand for investments may increase the short term interest rates, but higher interest rates are likely to diminish the demand for bank credit and investments. Therefore, the negative effect of interest rates in bank credit may be reflected in investments. 14 10 There is no need to take the first difference of the short term interest rate, as all the panel unit root tests presented in Table 1 found the series to be trend-stationary. 11 In the reported panel DSUR estimates a long-run covariance matrix is used, which makes panel DSUR more efficient when cross-sections are dependent. 12 DSUR estimations were implemented using Gauss. I am are grateful to Donggyu Sul for providing the program code on his homepage. 13 I also estimated a model including deterministic trends, but the main results did not change. Results are available upon request. 14 The correlation between short term interest rates and investments as a share of GDP is indeed positive and highly statistically significant. Results are available upon request. Table 5 presents the results of panel DSUR estimations on model 4 using the dataset spanning from 1972 to 2008. In addition to first differences of the GDP per capita, M2 share to GDP and investment share to GDP, the short-term interest rate (in levels) is included as an explanatory variable. 15 The results presented in Table 5 show that the cointegrating coefficient of top 1 % income share is positive and highly statistically significant. 16 The first differences of money share to GDP and the short-term interest rate have statistically significant negative parameter estimates. The negative effect of the short-term interest rate on the ratio of bank loans to real GDP is expected, as higher interest rates make borrowing more expensive. The negative parameter estimate of the share of M2 to GDP, on the other hand, is likely to result from reverse causality. That is, as bank loans increase, money held in deposit accounts (etc.) decreases, which will decrease the broad money in circulation. 17 Table 6 presents the results of panel DSUR estimations on model 5 with household loans as the dependent variable. The estimation period runs from 1980 to 2008.
According to the results of Table 6 , the cointegrating coefficient of the top 1 % income share is positive and highly statistically significant. The last column, which includes all control variables, shows that the real GDP per capita growth and short term interest rates are negatively associated with the share of household loans to real GDP and that the share of broad money has a positive association with it. The negative coefficient of the real GDP per capita growth is rather surprising and it holds even if we use only growth as an explanatory variable. This maybe due to the endogeneity of growth, which the first lags of the first differences of explanatory variables added to the estimated model were unable to control (see the Online Appendix for more explanation). Adding more lags of the first differences to the model is impossible because of short time series dimension of the data (the estimator does not converge if more lags are added). A second possible explanation is that the negative correlation between growth and the denominator of the dependent variable, the real GDP per capita, drives the result. However, the correlation coefficient between the level of household loans and GDP per capita growth is also negative (simple correlation coefficient between the level of bank credit and GDP growth is positive). A third possible explanation is that estimations are lacking some variable(s), whose effect is reflected in the negative coefficient of the GDP per capita growth. A fourth possible explanation is that, unintuitively, the relationship just is negative. This could be, for example, the result of consumption smoothing during recession. That is, households may smoothen their falling income during recessions due to, e.g., unemployment by accumulating debt, which could lead to the observed negative relationship. In any case, further exploring the exact reasons for the negative association between the share of household credit and the real GDP per capita growth is beyond the scope of this paper and it needs to be addressed in future studies. Roine et al. (2009) have shown that financial development, measured as the share of bank deposits and stock market capitalization, can have an effect on the income share of the top 1 %. 18 If the same applies to bank credit, there would be a reverse effect from credit to income inequality. The panel DSUR estimator by Mark et al. (2005) controls for this possible endogeneity by including the leads and lags of the first differences of the explanatory variables to the estimated model. The drawback of this method is that it is sensitive to the selection of leads and lags. If some or all of the explanatory variables are endogenous, and if the number of leads and lags has not been sufficient to eliminate the correlation between them and the error term, estimates will not be asymptotically unbiased. The null hypothesis is that X does not Granger cause Y . Lag lengths were determined using Akaike information criterion. The empirical distribution and the critical values based on the Fisher statistics were generated using 10000 bootstrap replications
Granger causality tests
Testing for this possible bias without strictly exogenous instruments is difficult. However, Granger non-causality test can be used to assess whether income inequality helps to forecast the share of bank credit and vice versa. Although this is not an actual test for causality, it will show the direction of the flow of statistical (predictive) information, which can be used to assess whether there are reasons to suspect a reverse effect or causality running from bank credit to income inequality.
I use the Granger non-causality test by Emirmahmutoglu and Kose (2011) , developed for heterogeneous cointegrated panels. It conducts N separate time series tests and then calculates the Fisher (1932) test statistics using the obtained individual p-values. Cross-sectional correlation is controlled for by using the bootstrap method for obtaining the empirical distribution of the Fisher statistic and associated critical values. Table 7 presents results for Granger non-causality test between the share of bank credit to RGDP and the top 1 % income share as well result between the share of household loans to RGDP and the top 1 % income share. 19 According to the results presented in the first two rows of Table 7 , there is no information in the share of bank credit to real GDP series that would help to forecast the top 1 % income share series at the 5 % level of significance. However, the information contained into the top 1 % income series does help to forecast the share of credit to RGDP at the 1 % level of significance.
The results presented in the last two rows of Table 7 imply that there is no information in the share of household loans to real GDP series that helps to forecast the top 1 % income share series at the 5 % level of significance. The same holds for information on the top 1 % income share, which seems not to be helpful in forecasting the share of household loans at the 5 % level of significance. This is a surprising finding, because the two series were found to be cointegrated (see Section 4.2). However, Granger non-causality test measures the flow of predictive information, meaning that it measures the effect of a variable to a future values of another variable. Because the share of household loans to RGDP and top 1 % income share were found to be cointegrated, they are likely to share a relation that is instantaneous in nature. Time series tests of instantaneous causality using a pooled VAR do, indeed, imply that the variables possess such instantaneous relationship (see the Online Appendix). 20 Unfortunately, the test does not reveal the direction of the flow of statistical information between the share of household loans and top 1 % income share.
To summarize, the results of Granger non-causality tests indicate that the flow of information would run from income inequality to bank credit. This diminishes the endogeneity problem and shows that the estimation results presented in the previous section are not driven by mere statistical correlation. That is, results indicate that income inequality has a positive long-run effect on the share of credit to real GDP. The story with household loans is different, however. The "instantaneous causality" between top 1 % income shares and household loans may be an indication of a third variable driving changes in both variables at the same time. One such variable could be cuts made on the marginal tax rate stabilized by cuts on the social expenditures. In such a scenario, decreases in the marginal tax rate could diminish top 1 % income shares (see Roine et al. 2009 ) and increase the risktaking, i.e., leverage of the richer households who benefit from such cuts (see Stockhammer 2013) . This would lead to a positive association between household loans and inequality that is caused by a third variable. This issue needs to be studied further in future studies. Schularik and Taylor (2012, p. 1031) have described the period after the Second World War as the "age of unprecedented risk and leverage". Iacoviello (2008) shows that income inequality has contributed to the rise of household debt in the United States during this era. Kumhof et al. (2015) argue that there is a more general, long-run relationship between these variables, where income inequality will lead to increasing leverage in the economy. In this study, I have tested the existence of such a long-run relationship.
Conclusion
According to the results, there is a long-run steady-state relationship between income inequality and bank credit in developed economies and the long-run elasticity of credit with respect to income inequality was found to be positive. Income inequality was also found to have an one-way Granger causality relationship to bank credit. These results indicate that income inequality has contributed to the increase of leverage in accordance with the theories by Iacoviello (2008) , Rajan (2010) and Kumhof et al. (2015) . However, the direction of the flow of statistical information between income inequality and loans to households could not be established.
Due to the pioneering nature of these findings, there are many possible directions for future research. The direction of causality between income inequality and different forms of credit needs to be addressed in future studies. This is important, because some third variable, like tax reforms, may affect both the demand for the bank credit and inequality. The analysis presented herein also concentrated on developed economies, but the relationship between inequality and credit may differ, for example, in developing economies. Most importantly, future research should include the examination of the effect of income inequality on the probability of financial crises. By disentangling the effect of income inequality and credit as predictors of financial crises, the channels through which income inequality may increase the probability of crises would be made clearer.
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